To evaluate the impacts of ¢shing on marine ecosystems, the total extraction of ¢sh must be known. Putting a ¢gure on total extraction entails the di⁄cult task of estimating, in addition to reported landings, discards, illegal and unmandated catches. Unreported catches cast various types of shadow, which may be tracked and estimated quantitatively. Some shadows of unreported catches are reviewed, for example, an innovative, well-funded NGO publicizes illegal catch in the Southern Ocean. For various reasons, o⁄cial ¢gures often have the implicit but unacceptable assumption that such categories are null. We present an estimation procedure based on adjustment factors taken from observer reports, correspondents and published information that track changes in a regulatory regime, and hence re£ect incentives and disincentives to misreport. Monte Carlo simulations address uncertainty using multiple sources of information to provide upper and lower estimates. Once in place, this method provides preliminary estimates that may be re¢ned without disruption. The method is demonstrated for ¢sheries in Iceland and Morocco. We use a 'by-species' approach for Icelandic cod and haddock, while the Moroccan catch is divided into demersal and pelagic categories. Results suggest that Icelandic cod catches may have been underestimated by between 1 and 14% at di¡erent times, and haddock by between 1 and 28%. Underestimation of Moroccan catches appears to have been as much as by 50%. These case studies show that it is possible to obtain estimates of misreporting, even when direct data are lacking. Our method encourages transparency because sources of information are presented so that uncertain values are easily identi¢ed, o¡ering a
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Introduction
Estimation of the total extractions of marine organisms is essential if the true impacts of ¢sheries are to be evaluated. Ecosystem analysis techniques suitable for this on a global scale have only recently become available (e.g. in the 'Sea Around Us' project: see articles in Pauly and Pitcher 2000) . Unfortunately, estimation of total catch is not easy because, for many of the world's ¢sheries, an unknown amount is not reported to any o⁄cial body. In some cases, unreported catch may be deliberately concealed by individuals or organizations, and in other cases, for certain species, there is no obligation to report catches. In this paper, we present a methodology for making estimates of unreported catch. Our analyses will touch on controversial topics, and can be expected, in some cases, to be at variance with conventional assessments or o⁄cial positions.
Categories of ¢sheries catches
Fisheries catches may be separated into three components: 1 Nominal catch reported to a monitoring agency: generally to a national body that itself reports to FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2 Reported discards: the nontargeted part of a catch, thrown overboard and often consisting of the juveniles of targeted or other species caught due to the unselective nature of the gear. At least in recent years, there are generally attempts to estimate this by an observer program. 3 Unreported catch: consisting of categories not covered by the reporting system in question. Category 3, unreported catch, may be further subdivided into 3.1 Unreported discards: which may or may not be illegal, but are not reported by observers. 3.2 Unmandated catches: catches that a given agency is not mandated to record, either on account of the small size of the vessel (e.g. catch is not reported from small inshore vessels in the UK), or the nature of the species (e.g. lump¢sh, Cyclopterus lumpus, in Iceland). It may include discards of species not considered important enough to record, such as pelagic species in some ground¢sh ¢sheries. A further example is catch from sport ¢sheries, which is often unmandated (it is not included in the FAO database) but can be signi¢cant (see Walters 1995) . 3.3 Illegal catch: catches that contravene a regulation from the regulatory body.They may be unreported because there is no legal right to ¢sh in the area (poaching), or may be landed away from the home port or trans-shipped to foreign£agged vessels at sea. It includes disreported catches, whose identity (by species or size) may be deliberately misreported and concealed, usually to conceal quota violations, such as haddock (Melanogrammus aegel¢nus), reported as cod (Gadus morhua), salmon (Salmo salar) concealed under surface layers of hake (Merluccius merluccius), or cod reported as 'black¢sh'. As well as unreported and illegal catches, the total mortality experienced by a stock also includes ghost ('cryptic') ¢shing mortality and other unaccounted sources of mortality. This topic is comprehensively reviewed by Alverson (2000) , building on the work of ICES (1995) , and is not considered in detail here.
While our work was in progress (Pitcher and Watson 2000) and following a series of discussions in international fora such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Fisheries and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) convened a working group with mandate to evaluate, 'illegal, unreported and unregulated'catch (IUU: Bray 2000) , whose three categories are as follows (Bray 2000) : basis for comment, collaboration and re¢nement in estimating illegal and unreported ¢shing.
Estimating unreported catch T J Pitcher et al. illegal catch actually includes an element that may be reported (1^2 above), an estimated element (e.g. observer estimates of discards) and an unreported component. The FAO 'unregulated catch' category overlaps largely with our 'unmandated'category. The term'unauthorized'¢shing is also used, but also does not easily link to the other categories, except as an overarching term for all unreported and misreported catches.
An assumption of zero is unacceptable
Where landing or catch data do not provide amounts of discards, or estimate unreported catches, it is important to realize that an implicit assumption has often been made that such categories are zero. It is not our purpose to comment on the e¡ect that such assumptions may have on conventional stock assessments and, in fact, estimates of some unreported catches, sometimes called 'unassigned', are often used in stock assessments. Presumably for fear of embarrassing state governments, these ¢gures generally remain con¢dential, or lie concealed in semiprivate stock assessment working papers. In any event, they are not attributed to nations or locations but only to the ¢sh stocks under examination. Even FAO's own, well-founded study of discards (Alverson et al. 1994 ) is omitted from the published FAO database since this is mandated to report only landings. Leaving ¢gures at an implicit zero, as databases in the public domain tend to do, is unacceptable (Pauly 1998) , and any percentage estimate of unreported catch by category, based on validated information, will likely be closer to the truth.
A review of estimates of unreported catches
A number of methodologies have been used by researchers in an attempt to quantify unreported catches. For example, illegal landings have been estimated by comparison of reported landings with ¢sh-meal factory outputs. In the late 1980s, o⁄cial landing ¢gures for the Ecuadorian tropical chub mackerel (Scomber japonicus) ¢shery were suspect and a logbook system had proved unreliable. Since catches and catch-per-unit-e¡ort for this economically important ¢shery had been declining markedly, an accurate assessment of the ¢shery using reliable catch data was urgent (Patterson et al. 1990; Pitcher and Stokes1990) , and indeed the stock collapsed soon afterwards (Patterson et al. 1993) . The catch was cleverly estimated from the numbers of sacks of ¢shmeal output from the ¢shmeal factories (Patterson et al. 1990) .The weight of ¢sh input to the ¢shmeal process was back-calculated from conversion ratios at each stage of the industrial process. The number of ¢shing vessels in each month was estimated from o⁄cial permits issued each day ('zarpes'). Knowledge of the £eet structure allowed an estimate of the catch which did not go through this route (approximately 15%). Not only were the ¢nal catch estimates about double the o⁄cial catch statistics, but, disconcertingly, there was poor correlation between the two sets of ¢gures.
True catches of Peruvian anchovy (Engraulis ringens) in the 1970s were similarly estimated after it was realized that ¢sh meal plants were operating well below the stated conversion e⁄ciency (Castillo and Mendo 1987) . Adjustments made after structured interviews with industry members resulted in estimates of catch much closer to the capacity of processing plants and with ¢shmeal exports. For example, the o⁄cial 1970 catch ¢gure of 12 million tonnes was revised upward to16 million tonnes.
In Lake Malawi, artisanal catches of usipa (Engraulicypris sardella), caught at night and hence outside the work time of beach observers, were estimated by a census of sacks of dried ¢sh (Lewis and Tweddle 1990) . Exports from the Nankumba peninsula, which represents only 5% of the lake shoreline, represented a catch ¢ve times greater than the o⁄cial catch for the whole lake. The true usipa catch in 1985/1986 was likely between 50 000 and100 000 tonnes, contrasting with the o⁄cial ¢gure of 5573 tonnes. In South Africa, net con¢scations, and questionnaires ¢lled in by local ¢shers after gaining the con¢dence of local tribal chiefs (Mann 1995) , showed that true catches were142^210% of the reported catch.
Estimates of bycatch and discarding for di¡erent ¢sheries have been obtained using models of the ¢sh-ery (e.g. Stratoudakis et al. 1999; Ortiz et al. 2000) and in some cases economic models have been used to estimate incentives to discard (Anderson 1994; Arnason 1994) . Patterson (1998) tracked the numerical 'shadows' of illegal catch using a VPA technique with three gadoid ¢sheries, North Sea cod and west Scotland cod and whiting. He concluded that West Scotland stocks, but not those in the North Sea, had been under-reported since 1991 by a factor of 306 0%. In the French deep-water trawl ¢shery on the mid-Atlantic ridge, discards of smoothhead, Alepocephalus bairdi, a large watery ¢sh of no commercial value, were equal to approximately 50% of the retained catch of grenadiers, roughy, scabbard ¢sh and deep-water sharks (P. Lorence, Personnel Communication), an example of unmandated discards.
In1997, it is estimated from surveys that more than 75% of sword¢sh (Xiphius gladius) marketed in Spain was illegal. ICCAT records show that Spain exceeded its catch limit in both the North and South Atlantic in every year from1996 when the ICCAT quotas were introduced. For blue¢n tuna (Thunnus thynnus), Spain exceeded the catch limits of about 8000 tonnes by 19% in1995,58% in1996 and 51% in1997. Moreover, France, Italy, Japan and Morocco are reported as having illegal catches for blue¢n tuna and sword¢sh as large as those of Spain (Raymakers and Lynham 1999 (ISOFISH 1999) . Publicity by ISOFISH led to pressure on vessel owners by Argentinean, Spanish and Chilean governments. Some vessels were later re£agged in Belize, Panama, and Honduras. Moreover, port and trade authorities in Uruguay, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia and the French island of Re¤ union were identi¢ed as 'providing unquestioning support'to the tooth¢sh poachers, in allowing transshipments of illegally caught ¢sh. As consequence of this publicity, tooth¢sh conservation is now of international concern. ISOFISH is a model of what may achieved, with adequate funding, in identifying speci¢c illegal ¢shing and tracking the trade in illegally caught ¢sh that drives such activities. Harris (1998) , who appears to have had access to a considerable amount of privileged information, reports many instances of discards and disreported catch on Canadian ¢sh stocks that could be used to provide preliminary ¢gures for Canadian waters and that could be adjusted later in the light of better information. Some examples are:
In Canada, the arrest of a Spanish trawler (the Estai) in 1995, revealed a specially constructed secret hold that concealed unreported, illegal and undersized catch. There were two sets of logbooks, each reporting di¡erent catch ¢gures. From the skipper's secret logbook, total catch was found to be 100% under-reported (Harris 1998) . Moreover, 98% of the catch was undersized (and hence illegal). A signi¢cant amount of catch from the Estai was recorded in the logbook of another Spanish vessel, the Patricia Nores (Harris1998). Forty-¢ve percent of all Spanish catches of £ounder (Platichthys £esus) are said to be discarded at sea and not reported (Harris1998). In the late1980s, every haul of the trawl by Russian vessels was estimated to be under-reported by at least 10 tonnes (Internal DFO document, quoted by Harris (1998) . A number of correspondents providing information to the Sea Around Project have stated that, at least at this stage, they wish to remain anonymous, but, rather than being discarded as though it did not exist, we consider that this information may be used to provide a better estimate than zero for total extractions from these ¢sheries, and where con¢dential ¢g-ures are challenged, the obligation is to provide a transparent estimates of the contested amount. Some examples are:
In France, large quantities of 25^30 cm cod are illegally landed (two correspondents). In western Ireland, the true catch of large midwater trawlers targeting herring (Clupea harengus) and mackerel (Scomber scomber) is estimated to be at least double the reported catch quota of 50 000 tonnes (one correspondent). Between 20 and 50% of the catch of Scottish purse seiners in the 1990s was illegal (two correspondents). Unreported catch is said to equal reported catch for Humberside ¢sheries, and higher ¢gures applied to historical periods of distant water £eets before the EEZs (one correspondent). In Denmark, cod landings are often disreported as dog¢sh (Scyliorhinus stellaris) (one correspondent).
Method
Our estimation method allows the use of all available specialist studies and information on unreported catches in a given ¢shery, along with their uncertainty, and synthesizes them into a single analysis.
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Sources of information can be weighted by their credibility in Monte Carlo simulations.
Basis of the adjustment method
The procedure to adjust reported catches is based on a spreadsheet divided by decade (or other appropriate time periods), and by category of misreported catch (discarded, illegal and unreported). Adjustment factors for each time period respond to changes in the regulatory regime, and hence the incentives and disincentives to misreport. Quantitative values are assigned to the adjustment factors, which are used as ¢xed anchor points when supported by reports and information explicitly attributed to a variety of sources, published and unpublished, and interpolated up or down using 'in£uence factors'when information is not quantitative. Con¢dence intervals around estimates of total misreporting for each period in the analysis are obtained using a Monte Carlo simulation based on likely error ranges. The technique can easily be adapted as more species, more ¢sh-eries or more reliable anchor points are added to the analysis. Here, we demonstrate the method for two national ¢sheries: Iceland, where there are plentiful, reliable data on landings by species; and Morocco, where data are more sparse.
Case study 1: Iceland
Despite recent concern over an unexpected drop in cod stocks, in general, Icelandic ¢sheries are believed to be well-managed and to have overcome many of the economic problems often associated with national ¢sheries (Arnason 1995) . Major ¢sheries exist for both pelagic and demersal species. The pelagic ¢sheries, mainly capelin (Mallotus villosus), herring (Clupea harengus) and blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou), provide the bulk of the catch, but the demersal ¢shery provides most of the revenue, generating approximately 75% of the total value of catches (Arnason 1995 Arnason (1995 ) andValty¤ sson (2002 . Discarding in Icelandic waters has been illegal since 1996 but it still occurs, although its magnitude is widely debated. Other forms of misreporting are also believed to occur in some ¢sheries, but there is no o⁄cial estimate of their magnitude. Changes to the management of Icelandic ¢sheries over the past 50 years have had varying e¡ects on incentives to misreport. The following case study demonstrates our methodology for estimating unreported catches for two of Iceland's most important species, cod and haddock.
Estimating the e¡ects of in£uence factors Important historical changes to Iceland's regulatory regime are given in Table 1 . Incentives to discard can occur whenever there are constraints on the amount of ¢sh that can be o⁄cially landed. Constraints can be technological, where catching power exceeds onboard storage or processing facilities, or regulatory, where quotas restrict landings of certain species (Anderson 1994) . In both cases, there is an incentive for ¢shers to discard low-valued ¢sh in order to ¢ll the hold or quota with ¢sh of the greatest value ('high-grading': see Rettig 1986; Squires and Kirkley 1991; Anderson 1994; Walters and Pearse 1996; Turner 1997 ; for discussion of the e¡ects of quotas on discarding). Technological advances in Icelandic ¢sheries increase the likelihood of bumper catches and, therefore, increase the incidence of discarding, whereas changes such as regulatory increases in mesh size and the introduction of devices such as sorting grids on trawl nets have probably had the opposite e¡ect. Another side-e¡ect of the quota system is the deliberate misreporting of catches of valuable species that have low or expensive quotas. For example, since the introduction of the quota system, some vessels have been caught concealing catches of cod under layers of saithe (which has a much lower value than cod) and falsely reporting the whole catch as saithe.
Certain species, particularly haddock, Atlantic halibut, common skate (Dipturus batis), and Greenland shark (Somniosus microcephalus) are caught mainly for domestic consumption. These species are commonly eaten by ¢shers at sea and a certain amount can also legally be taken home for the family. These amounts are unmandated in that they are not required to be reported. Comparison of estimates of local consumption of seafood obtained from o⁄cial 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-2000 Mesh size processing statistics (5523 tonnes; Anonymous 1999a) and estimates obtained by a survey of Icelanders'diets (12 352 tonnes; Anonymous 1999b) reveal a discrepancy of 6829 tonnes, implying that many more ¢sh are landed than are reported. More than 70% of locally consumed ¢sh is haddock (Anonymous 1999a), and the ¢gures above suggest that haddock landings are underestimated by almost 5000 tonnes (equivalent to approximately 12% of the reported catch). Species which are mainly exported (such as cod) are monitored much more closely from the place of landing, through processing, to the ¢nal place of export (Halliday and Pinhorn 1996) and the same types of errors are not expected to a¡ect them. There is also evidence of a black market for locally consumed ¢sh. For example, some ¢sh-ers have been caught with far more ¢sh than they or their families could have eaten themselves, and a particular ¢sherman admitted that he had sold, on the black market, 200 tonnes of ¢llets in1 year, equalling about 500 tonnes of live ¢sh (Anon 2000). Although the extent of this practice is not known, a recent poll found that 20% of 1638 ¢shers interviewed have witnessed illegal landings of ¢sh in Iceland and 76% believe that illegal landings occur (Anonymous 2001) . It is expected that such illegal landings would have increased since the introduction of the quota system, especially in recent years when quotas have been expensive.
Methods
Clearly, there are complex factors in£uencing incentives to misreport catches, some of which seem to have con£icting e¡ects. Incentives are based on knowledge of the history of the ¢shery (listed in Table 1), while Table 2 gives estimates of incentives to misreport for Icelandic ¢sheries between 1950 and 2000. In the absence of information about discarding by foreign vessels, incentives for foreign vessels to discard are considered to be the same as for Icelandic vessels.We acknowledge that this may be a poor assumption in some cases. The magnitude of the in£uence factors (low, medium, . . .) is, at this stage, arbitrary. In£uence factors are meant to give an indication of relative di¡erences in the magnitude of misreporting among periods. To convert these qualitative estimates into meaningful ¢gures, informed anchor points were needed for at least some periods. Table 3 gives estimates of misreporting of cod and haddock by gear-type, according to six di¡erent sources. To allow meaningful comparison of estimates-by-gear, proportion of mean total catch taken by each gear type (Table 4 ) was used to re-scale the estimates (Table 5) . Because the estimates were now proportional to the total catch taken byall gears, they could be added to produce estimates of total discarding by all gears as a percentage of the total reported catch. This was easily done for the period 1995^1999 because estimates were available for all types of gear. For the other periods, some blank cells required estimates (see Table 5 ). Table 6 ).
The totals in Table 6 suggest that total discards for the period 1985^2000 were in the range of 1^11% of reported catch for cod and 2^20% for haddock (over and above reported catch). While the estimates for cod appeared to be within the same general range for the three most recent periods, the upper estimates for haddock for the periods 1990^1994 and 19951 999 were much higher than for the preceding period, 1985^1989 (Table 6 ). Incentives to misreport for both species were ranked as 'medium' for the periods after 1985 (see Table 2 ). As there was fairly good agreement among the cod estimates for these periods, the cod estimates were used to set the percentage values for the category 'medium'. The estimates for haddock, post 1990, were used to set the percentage values for the category 'medium^high'. Estimates of the amount of discarding (and other forms of misreporting) for periods prior to 1985 were obtained by interpolating the ranges found inTable 6 back to previous periods. Using the in£uences in Table 2 as a guide, the following percentage ranges were assigned: none ¼ 0^1%; low ¼ 1^3%; low/medium ¼ 2^6%; medium ¼ 3^12%; medium/high ¼ 4^24%; high ¼ 5^25%þ.
Note that the upper estimates vary more than the lower estimates, resulting in increased uncertainty as incentives to misreport increase. This also results in some overlap between categories, which we felt was realistic. Table 7 shows estimated ranges of misreporting based onTable 2 and the percentage ranges given above. There were, unfortunately, no quantitative anchor estimates for the magnitude of illegal landings, although these are known to occur (Anon 2000). Table 8 gives estimates of missing catch, obtained by multiplying mean reported catch (Table 9 ) by interpolated estimates of misreported catch (Table 7) . Table 10 then presents estimates of total extractions for Iceland from 1950 to 1998. 1950-1954 1955-1959 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-2000 Iceland Greater incentive to land more fish in this way after introduction of quotas.
Estimating unreported catch T J Pitcher et al. Results suggest that Icelandic cod catches may have been underestimated by between 1 and 14%, and haddock by between1and 28%.
Monte Carlo simulations
Monte Carlo simulations were used to investigate the e¡ects of uncertainty in in£uence factors and anchor points on estimates of total missing catch. Five thousand samples were taken from triangular distributions, assumed between the lower and upper estimates of total missing catch for each period.
Results are shown as error bars on Fig. 2 .
Discussion
This analysis is incomplete without total extractions of all species, including non-commercial ¢sh, caught 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 Cod in Icelandic waters. Published estimates of discarding exist for some species other than cod and haddock (e.g. red¢sh: Gunnarsson 1995 and Agnarsson 2000 ; saithe: Gunnarsson 1995 and Anonymous 1993) and for these species, the same procedure can be followed as for cod and haddock (above). For most species, however, there are no such estimates. In the absence of estimates in the published literature (or other reliable sources), a detailed analysis of Iceland's ¢sheries would involve deciding which species can appropriately be grouped together, based on in£u-ences acting on them, and extrapolating to them appropriate estimates of misreporting obtained from reliable sources for similar species. A major project has recently been initiated by the Icelandic government to compare catches by boats with observers with landings by boats without observers, to gain better estimates of discarding.
Case study 2: Morocco
In many countries, particularly in tropical regions where mixed-species ¢sheries are common, detailed statistics are not collected. The following example illustrates an application of our methodology to such a data-sparse ¢shery in Morocco. For a detailed analysis of this ¢shery, see Baddyr and Gue¤ nette (2002) . Moroccan ¢sheries can be classi¢ed under three headings: the Moroccan small-scale £eet, consisting mainly of small wooden dories; the more modern coastal £eet, which consists of medium-sized trawlers, purse seiners and long-liners; and the industrial Table 5 Estimates of discarding of cod and haddock by di¡erent gear-types, as a percentage of the total reported catch by all gear types. Estimates were obtained by multiplying the estimates in Table 3 with (unrounded) proportions in Table 5 .
Species
Gear 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 Note: Proportions shown in Table 4 were rounded for presentation. Unrounded proportions were used to calculate the percentages in the above table. Table 6 Interpolated estimates of discarding by gear (italics; non-italics are anchor points). Estimates are presented as percentages of total reported catch (over and above reported catch) and refer to catches taken by Icelandic vessels. Gear 1980 Gear -1984 Gear 1985 Gear -1989 Gear 1990 Gear -1994 Gear 1995 Gear -1999 1950-1954 1955-1959 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 Iceland Estimating unreported catch T J Pitcher et al. 328 Table 8 Estimates of missing catch (tonnes) for cod and haddock. Lower and upper refer to top and bottom of the estimated range of misreporting for each period. Note that data for o⁄cial foreign catches are provided only until1997.
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£eet, which is made up almost exclusively of large freezer trawlers ¢shing for several weeks at a time. Foreign vessels, mainly from Spain, Eastern Europe, Japan and Korea have also ¢shed extensively in Moroccan waters (Baddyr and Gue¤ nette 2002) . Baddyr (1989) concluded that discarding does not occur in the small-scale ¢shery, as the whole catch is sold. Estimates of unreported landings and discarding are, therefore, presented only for coastal, industrial and foreign £eets. Unreported landings include consumption by ¢shermen (similar to the unmandated landings in Iceland), illegal sale of ¢sh and mistakes in weighing the catch. Table 11 shows estimates of discarding and underreporting obtained from several sources. Recall that in the Iceland example, anchor points were used to guide assignment of ranges which corresponded to di¡erent categories in the table of in£uences (Table 2 ). In this case, anchor estimates were interpolated directly into blank cells if the in£uences were considered to be the same (an alternative method when few periods are under consideration). Where there was no range in the anchor points, interpolated estimates were given an arbitrary upper and lower bound of AE5% (Table 12 ). In support of this value, anchor ranges, where obtained, ranged from 4 to 13% in any particular period (see Table 11 ) and our upper and lower bounds of AE 5% are within this region. Estimates of unreported catch, discards and total extractions are shown in Table 13 . Estimates of the range of total misreporting for each period were obtained using the Monte Carlo simulation described above. Results are shown in Fig. 3 . Overall, our analysis suggests that Moroccan catches appear to have been under-reported by as much as by 50%.
Discussion
Records of exact species compositions of Moroccan landings do not exist. For example, reported landings of demersal species in Morocco were dominated by an unidenti¢ed mixture of species, as were a large part of the foreign catches (Baddyr and Gue¤ nette 2002) .When the composition of the reported catch is not known, we cannot quantify the magnitude of misreporting for individual species but it is possible, however, to at least identify some of the species that make up the unreported catch.
Discarding. Sardines (Sardina pilchardus) comprise the majority of the both the pelagic catch (approximately 94% of the total catch: Oueld Taleb 1988) and discards, dumped either at sea or during net cleaning (El Mamoun 1999). As discarding by pelagic £eets is Table 9 Mean reported landed catches of cod and haddock in Icelandic waters (tonnes). Please note that data for o⁄cial foreign catches are only provided until1997. Estimating unreported catch T J Pitcher et al.
Table 10
Estimated total extractions (tonnes) of cod and haddock obtained by adding reported landings (Table 8) to estimated missing catch (Table 9 ). Grey cells are percentages. Lower and upper refer to the top and bottom of the estimated range of misreporting for each period. Unreported is percentage (rounded) of the total estimated catch not reported (over and above estimated total catch). Note that o⁄cial data for foreign catches are only provided until1997.
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considered to be less than 5% of the total catch (Table 12) , the quantity of discards of other pelagic species is probably not signi¢cant (less than 0.3% of the total catch). In demersal £eets, coastal bottom trawlers, which landed more than 90% of the Moroccan commercial catch, discarded undersized and putre¢ed commercial species (cephalopods and a number of species in the families Trichiuridae, Sparidae, Merluccidae, Pleuronectiformes, Scianenidae, Haemulidae and Gadidae). A range of other species were also discarded, including boar¢shes (Macrorhamphorus scolopax and M. gracilis), small-spotted catsharks (Scyliorhinus canicula), sabre argente¤ (Lepidopus caudatus), congers (Conger conger), crabs, rays and rock¢shes (El Mamoun1999).The composition of species discarded by Spanish cephalopod trawlers consisted mainly of seabream (Sparidae), other unidenti¢ed demersal ¢n¢sh, members of the families Chondricthyes andTriglidae, and invertebrates other than cephalopods (Balguer|¤ as 1997). It is probably appropriate to assume a similar composition for other types of demersal trawlers or for Moroccan industrial demersal vessels. Under-reporting. Durand (1995) reported that up to 60% of Moroccan catch, especially valuable species like mackerel and anchovies, may be marketed Table 11 Estimates of discarding and unreported landings for Moroccan coastal and industrial £eets and foreign £eets ¢shing in Moroccan waters. Percentages of discards are percentages of estimated total catch (including reported landings, unreported landings and discards) as used by Baddyr and Gue¤ nette 2001) . Percentages of unreported landings are percentages of estimated total landings (including reported and unreported landings) as used by Baddyr and Gue¤ nette (2001) .
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Fishery Type 1970 Type -1979 Type 1980 Type -1989 Type 1990 Type -1999 Coastal Durand (1995) . d Balgueřías (1997) . e Haddad (1994) . 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 Coastal 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 Estimating unreported catch T J Pitcher et al. 334 through illegal channels to avoid taxes. Cephalopods and crustaceans are also very susceptible to underreporting (El Mamoun 1999) . In the 1970s and 1980s, a large proportion of the Moroccan industrial £eet's catch was landed outside Morocco (e.g. in the Canary Islands), and we can assume that the composition of catch unaccounted for in this period is similar to the composition of today's commercial catch. As with all analyses of this type, it is most important to maintain contact with individuals who have detailed knowledge of the ¢shery, who can provide information to ¢ll in gaps where data are missing.
Discussion
Unreported extractions cast various kinds of shadows on ¢sheries and their associated activities. These shadows can help us track them. The methodology presented here o¡ers a transparent and simple way of estimating unreported catches, using information from a variety of sources. Estimates are presented so that areas where information is lacking are easily identi¢ed, o¡ering a basis for comment, discussion and, it is hoped, collaboration that will lead to provision of further information and improvement of the estimates. Information provided in con¢dence may be challenged, but publication of provisional estimates may encourage more transparency.
The method has a di⁄culty in that we use a percentage of the reported catch. How do we deal with the problem where no catch is reported, yet discards and illegal catch are known to occur? Patterson (1998) considers it easier to estimate catch'reporting e⁄ciency' (i.e. accuracy) than to make absolute estimates of unreported catch. But the key here is that we are interested in an annual value for whole ecosystems. Therefore, attempts should be made to raise ¢gures in tonnes to annual values and compare these with the annual catch of the species over the whole system. In the method, our in£uence factors remain the same, and if anchor points are given in absolute terms, the answers will be in the same modality if desired.
So far, most of the information used to anchor estimates has come from published reports, news items or university theses, although where personal comments or other sources given an estimate of reliability can be used. When setting the anchor points, for example, informants may be asked to rank the severity of unreported catches. In fact, humans are quite good at ranking things presented in pairs, asking the question 'which is the better and which is the worse?'A series of paired questions might be developed for a more formal protocols here. The results we obtained for Icelandic cod and haddock are only preliminary, as more information is needed for periods prior to 1985. More information is also needed about factors in£uencing foreign £eets, which were assumed to have been under the same in£uences as Icelandic £eets. The most subjective part of the analysis was assigning percentage values to the in£uence factors. In analyses such as these, there will inevitably be occasions when estimated in£uence factors do not seem to agree with the anchor points, as was the case for haddock for the periods 1990^1994 and 1995^1999. In this case, because the anchor points were considered to be reliable and because there was a consistent trend among gear-types, we chose to recognize this as a real trend and upgraded our estimate of the in£uence factors for this period. In other cases, an anchor point may be considered less reliable than the table of in£u-ences. For the present, problems such as this need to be treated on a case-by-case basis, until there have been enough case studies to develop a more formal framework for dealing with them. More information is needed about in£uences acting upon other species, including susceptibility to di¡erent gears and economic factors such as cost of quotas and market value. The Moroccan case study illustrated that it is possible to obtain estimates of under-reporting, even when data is lacking, and that in some cases, underreporting may be signi¢cant. Coarse estimates of species compositions of unreported catches were obtained and it is hoped that these estimates will be re¢ned as more information comes to hand.
In these two case studies, we considered all sources of information to be equally reliable (i.e. we did not weight estimates according to our opinion of the reliability of the source). This was because the estimates, in this case, came from scienti¢c papers, scienti¢c reports, theses or large-scale surveys, with one exception, Pa¤ lsson (2001), which was a newspaper article. Newspaper articles would normally be treated with some suspicion in terms of reliability. In this case, however, the author was an Icelandic ¢sheries scientist, with numerous scienti¢c publications.
In future work, it may be necessary to use newspaper reports or personal comments as anchor points and the reliability of these will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis and di¡ering reliabilities will have correspondingly di¡erent error ranges. We will have to persist with anonymous informers (all of whom are highly reputable ¢shery scientists or they would not have been contacted for information in the ¢rst place!), until such time as the pressure to correct our ¢gures forces those with better data to break cover.
Bene¢ts from a transparent new method Murawski (1996) has looked at factors in£uencing discards in data from the US and Canada. General linear models were ¢tted to discard rates, total catch, species richness, species diversity evenness, together with operational variables associated with the ¢sh-ing process (codend mesh, vessel size, tow duration, total catch, target species, year, month, depth and statistical area). Variances were high, but ¢sheries managed by mesh and ¢sh size generally had higher discard rates.Year classes with high abundance in£u-enced discard rates disproportionately. Murawski worked with observer estimates of discards, whereas the focus of this paper is to suggest a method to use when such data is not available.
In the ICES area, estimates of illegal ¢shing are routinely made by the stock assessment working parties that regularly perform single-species stock assessment.Yet, it is an unwritten but strictly imposed tradition that the basis of such adjustments are not made public, even when o⁄cials have direct knowledge of speci¢c events. Such a policy of secrecy would likely be news for the public of the countries involved. Covering up for illegal ¢shing would be unthinkable if this were illegal drug running. Bank sta¡ who defraud the public of millions of dollars are not protected by a shield of anonymity^so why should this protection be a¡orded to illegal ¢shers?
Evaluation by FAO of IUU ¢shing
Bray (2000) reviews IUU experience world wide, and points the ¢nger at £ag states for not providing adequate human and ¢nancial resources to tackle the problem. In this work, FAO has published a strong message concerning the critical importance of IUU ¢shing to the sustainability of bene¢ts from capture ¢sheries. For example, Evans (2000) considers that IUU ¢shing distorts and devalues information from compliant ¢sheries, lowers allowable catches set using the precautionary approach, and increases uncertainty and the risk of over-exploitation. Evans considers that, at national scales, there is often complacency about the intractability of the problem, echoing our concerns expressed above. Evans considers some ¢sheries, where new technology has recently made deep-water or marginal stocks vulnerable, to be under-reported by as much as 75%, and in the case of stocks on the high seas, over 100%. Evans sees compliance with FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (see Edeson 1996; Doulman 1998) as an essential ¢rst step in improving the situation. Doulman (2000) also considers IUU to be major £aw in present ¢sheries management, leading to a loss of economic and social bene¢ts, and, in extreme cases, to the collapse of stocks. Doulman (2000) calls for a protocol that can operate regionally, subregionally and nationally, and be applicable to di¡erent types of ¢sheries and stock distributions.We o¡er the method set out here as an starting point for such a protocol.
Finally, Edeson (2000) reviews the legal remedies available to combat IUU ¢shing. In particular, the possible role of the FAO Code of Conduct as an instrument of international lawand a part of an InternationalPlan of Action.Within the EEZs of nations, although some national laws might be improved, the problem is more a lack of implementation of existing regulations. Edeson considers this situation might be improved by explicit adoption and enforcement by of the FAO Code of Conduct by the £ag state of the vessel.
Cheating is widespread in ¢sheries, the penalties are low, and the risk of detection as the participants are well aware, is often low, Unfortunately, political disincentives lead many concerned with ¢sheries to downplay their knowledge of this cheating. Where government and o⁄cial sources have strong links, and even funding, from industry, we may expect these disincentives to be stronger. Fraud on this scale has not only contributed to the depletion of marine ecosystems and contributed to disastrous stock collapses, but has foreclosed options for the future generation of wealth and sustainable bene¢ts from marine resources. Like any other criminal act, we need to estimate the true magnitude of unreported and illegal ¢shing.
